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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

pressed because, 'WVhether an agreement of purchase and sale has
conveyed all of the property interests involved so as to make the
purchaser fully taxable on all of the resultant earnings or whether
the contract has reserved an interest in the seller on which the
seller is taxable is a question of the intent of the parties in making
the agreement. This intent may be inferred from the wording of
the agreement and from the surrounding circumstances." Vermont
Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1955).
Where the vendor retains a mineral royalty from land sold, it
will constitute an economic interest in the land and requires treatment of his income from it as royalties taxable as ordinary income
and not as purchase money payments taxable as capital gain.
Hamme v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1953).
If a conveyance provides that the vendor is selling his property
in consideration of a cash payment and future royalty payments,
then it is not a sale but a leasing arrangement and the payments
received thereunder are taxable as ordinary income and not as
capital gain. Hamme v. Commissioner, supra; McLean v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1941).
There seems to be no doubt that the decision of the court was
just and correct. The only problem that presents itself to this
writer is why the court spent so much of its time trying to justify
its refusal to consider fair market value of the overriding royalty
interest when, to begin with, the transaction was not a sale. If the
court did not intend to imply the reservation of economic interests
to this case and meant to treat it as a sale, then its decision, though
good, is seemingly not based on well established authority but
appears to be a minority ruling.
M. J. F.
INcomm TAx-Loss

INCMENT TO "SALE" INVOLVING OIL AND GAS

ALLowED.-A, taxpayer and
sole transferee of X oil company, assigned to B developed leaseholds and tangible assets with an adjusted basis of 832,500 dollars,
for a co--nideratiii -of 250,000 dollars, and specifically reserved a
pirbduction payment in eighty-five per cent of the working interest
in the property. This exception was to terminate when A had
received a sum of 3,600,000 dollars plus taxes and interest, the
payment to be contingent upon production. A subsequently assigned the production payment to C for 3,600,000 dollars. X cornPRODucIoN PAYMENT-DEDuCroN
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pany declared a loss deduction of 82,500 dollars, representing the
difference between the adjusted basis of the property conveyed to B
and the cash payment received therefor. The deduction was disallowed by the Commissioner and his position was upheld by the
Tax Court. Held, reversed. The company never parted with an
eighty-five per cent share of working interest, and the production
payment did not constitute part of the consideration. The company, therefore, sustained a deductible loss in the computation of
income and excess profits taxes. Kline v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d
854 (9th Cir. 1959).
The loss in the principal case was incurred as an incident of a
"sale" involving the use of the well recognized A-B-C transaction. See SuinvA,

Om AND GAs

LAw

535 (1955).

The A-B-C scheme allows A, as the operator, to assign tangible
assets and the property to B for a small cash consideration, while
excepting and reserving in himself a production payment, and
then permits A to assign the reserved payment to C. This payment,
plus any gain derived from a comparison of the cash received to
the basis of the assets and property interests conveyed to B, constitutes an alienation of A's entire interest in the property for a
consideration taxable under the capital gains provisions. INT. 1Ev.

of 1954, §§ 1221, 1231; I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 10.
A retained production payment is to be distinguished from a
royalty in that the former is an in rem economic interest in oil
and gas from a specific tract of land. It is free of production
expenses, limited by an inflexible maximum recovery, and it does
not extend for the life of the leasehold, but only for a fractional
part thereof. A royalty is co-terminous with the life of the working
interest, and, in its common form has no maximum recovery. The
owner of the latter is accorded ordinary income treatment. Thomas
v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551
(1932); Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 459
(5th Cir. 1941). See generally, BREEDiNG & BuRTON, TAXAnION OF
Om AND GAS INcomE (1954).
The problem of the Kline case, supra, arose not, therefore,
from the rather spectacular application of the A-B-C transaction
and the resultant 3,600,000 dollars retained payment, but rather
from the loss incident to the sale of "adjusted-to-basis" leaseholds
and depreciated tangible assets, in that part of the transaction
which involved the sale from A to B. Herein the question arose as
to whether such figure (82,500 dollars deduction) represented an
CoDE
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actual. economic loss to the taxpayer or whether it was merely
theoretical, in that the taxpayer retained the production payment.
The Commissioner admitted that in the A-B-C transaction
that tie sale of the retained production payment was to be accorded
capital gains treatment. He argued, however, that the sale of the
assets at a consideration lower than their depreciated value should
not permit the incidence of a deductible loss, since the transaction
was to be viewed as integrated for tax purposes. For his authority
he relied upon G.C.M. 23623, 1943-1 Cur. Bull. 313, which provided:
"In cases in which the cash payment is less than the
depreciated cost of the depreciable equipment passing by asigument, the excess of such cost over the cash payment represents part of the depletable cost of the retained economic
interest... in oil and gas in place. It seems apparent that in
such cases the entire cost of the assignor, including the cost
oF depreciable equipment on the property, represents the cost
of the interest retained."
Ihis inflexible rule, disallowing any such loss arising from
transactions involving section 1221 or section 1231 assets, and a
retained production payment, has been somewhat abrogated by a
decision of the Supreme Court. Choate v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 1
(1945) (by implication). The Choate case clearly stands for the
proposition that the tax result in such a fact situation is determined
by the intent of the parties. Specifically, the conclusion in a particula case depends on the Tax Court's findings as to "intent,"
thereby involving all the varied facts from which inferences may
be drawn.
In the Kline case, supra, the Commissioner and the Tax Court
held that there was no evidence in the "sale" itself that the sole
consideration for the tangible property was the 250,000 dollars
paid. The Tax Court, following G.C.M. 23623, supra, held that
the parties could have if not restricted, varied with impunity or
even eliminated the cash consideration by a collateral variation
in the amount of the production payment. That court found nowhere in the instrument of conveyance any language indicating
expressly, or by implication, that the sum of 250,000 dollars was
the sole consideration. It concluded that, from a view of the instrument in its entirety-with particular emphasis on those covenants
permitting A (or his assignee, C) visitorial privileges, and those
fixing the obligation of taxes and interest on B-the transaction
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must be regarded as a "package deal" supported by sub rosa consideration far in excess of the actual amount paid.
The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court, found that
three interests were involved in the "sale" to B. Two interests were
sold: (1) fifteen per cent of the working interests in the leases;
(2) tangible assets (equipment). One interest was retained, which
was a production payment in eighty-five per cent of the working
interests in the leases. To add support to this division, it is to be
noted that the taxpayer had testified that the consideration was
agreed upon with B, an unrelated party, and that both interests
were set at fair market value as a result of open negotiations prior
to the execution of the conveyance. With the above in mind, the
Court in sustaining the deduction, said in relation to the production payment:
"The company never parted with this interest and it,
accordingly, has no bearing upon the problem of the amount
of gain or loss derived by the company from the sale of what
it actually did sell to [B]...."
In the principal case the court further held that the visitorial
privileges and other covenants relating to taxes and interest were
incident only to the production payment and, as such, did not
relate to the sale of the tangible assets and the remaining fraction
of leasehold interest.
Taxwise, the Ninth Circuit has, therefore, dichotomized the
A-B-C transaction. This remarkable decision has done more than
merely enhance the vitality of the "intent" theory; it has conclusively rejected the Commissioner's position which was promulgated in G.C.M. 28628, supra.
On the assumption that the case will be carried to appeal,
one might well question whether the production payment involved
was preserved true to form, that is, as a retention of a valid working interest. It is submitted that, by a construction of the language
of the conveyance as regards the "tax-free" and "interest-accruing"
covenants, a conclusion is suggested of a base retention of an
expense-free income right, rather than of a working interest. Such
a conclusion, if merited, would call for a different treatment of the
facts at hand.
Should the Kline decision be accepted, in toto, it would probably effect an unintended extension of an existing tax advantage
(asset treatment of a production right). Should this decision, how-
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ever, be directly nullified, it appears that strict application of
G.C.M. 23623, supra, would exact hardship upon the small operator experiencing bona fide loss in this type of transaction, and that
it would be detrimental to the policy adopted by Congress toward
encouragement of the development and expansion of this vital
industry.
The application of the "intent" theory, which gained tacit
approval in the Choate case, supra, would seem to be the soundest
approach in the determination of whether given deductions, occasioned by "sales" involving production payments, are to be permitted. as valid economic losses, or to be disallowed as merely
theoretical "losses."
C. H. H. II
LkBoR LAW-INJUNCnONs OF STRIKS AFFEcrING NAnTONAL
HviH AND SArry.-The United States sought and obtained in

the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania an
injunction under the National Emergency provisions of the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), §§ 206-210, 208,
29 U.S.C. 176-180, 178 (1947), against the continuation of an
industry-wide strike in the basic steel industry. United States v.
United Steelworkers, 178 F. Supp. 247 (W.D. Pa. 1959). The
Court of Appeals affirmed. United Steelworkers v. United States,
271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1959). On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed. Held, by eight justices in a per curiam
decision which was amplified by a separate opinion filed later by
Franldurter and Harlan, JJ., that the judgement below was amply
supported by the district court's finding that the strike's continuation imperiled the national safety and that the statute as applied
was not violative of the constitutional limitation prohibiting courts
from exercising powers of a legislative or executive nature. Douglas, J., dissented, stating: (1) that the case should be remanded
to the district court for particularized findings as to how the steel

strike imperiled the national health; and (2) that since equity
traditionally exercises jurisdiction, it should not be held that the
only way to remove the danger to national safety is to issue a
blanket injunction in the absence of a showing that a partial reopening would not be sufficient. United Steelworkers v. United
States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1 (Nov. 7, 1959), 80 Sup. Ct. 177 (Dec. 7, 1959).
The National Emergency provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act (hereinafter designated L.M.R.A.), § § 206-210,
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